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THE CONTINUED AVAILABILITY OF PRIVATE ACTIONS
FOR FRAUD UNDER THE SECURITIES STATUTES
IN COMMODITY-SECURITY TRANSACTIONS
A commodity futures contract is a standardized contract for the purchase
and sale of a fixed quantity of a commodity for delivery on a specified future
date at a determined price.' In the late 1960's, this simple contractual form was
transformed into and used for increasingly complicated arrangements. 2 The
resulting changes in the nature of futures trading significantly reduced the ef-
fectiveness of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA),' in regulating the com-
modities industry. First, the CEA covered only a narrow listing of agricultural
items. 4
 Therefore, although futures trading was expanding rapidly into many
non-agricultural products,' trading in these items could not be regulated by the
CEA. Second, the small staff and limited trade and commercial experiences of
A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD $
4.6 (421), at 82.181 [hereinafter cited as BROMBERG & LOWENFELS]. Commodity forward con-
tracts are similar to commodity futures contracts; however, they are not traded on exchanges nor
are they standardized but rather are individually negotiated. Id. 4.6 (423), at 82.188.
2 See id. 5 4.6 (400-446), at 82.101-82.269. Examples of these more complicated trans-
actions are discretionary trading accounts in commodity futures contracts and commodity op-
tions. The discretionary accounts are agreements created by dealers whereby a customer gives a
broker authority to buy and to sell commodity futures, commodity forwards, and bare com-
modities at the broker's discretion without consulting the customer. Id. 5 4.6 (430-31), at 82.201.
These accounts can be formed as either commodity pools in which the customers share in profits
and losses or individual arrangements. Id.
Commodity options are contracts in which the option holder or purchaser is given the
right to purchase certain commodities from the option seller at a determined price for a specified
period of time. Long, Commodity Options — Revisited, 25 DRAKE L. REV. 75 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Long]. Options can be either naked or covered. A naked option is one party's simple un-
supported promise to buy or sell a futures contract at a specified time and price. Long, supra, at
82-102; BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 1, $ 4.6 (441), at 82.242. A covered option is dif-
ferent in that the party promising to buy or sell takes steps to insure that he will be able to per-
form the contract. BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 1, 5 4.6 (441), at 82.242.
3
 Ch. 545, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (current version at 7 U.S.C. $5 1-22 (1976) and 7
U.S.C. 55 1-22 (Supp. III 1979)). The CEA had governed futures trading since 1936. See
Hewitt, The Line Between Commodities and Securities — Part I, 1 AGRIC. L. J. 291, 292 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Hewitt].
4
 7 U.S.C. $ 2 (1970) provided:
The word "commodity" shall mean wheat, cotton, rice, corn, oats, barley, rye,
flaxseed, grain sorghums, mill feeds, butter, eggs, onions, Solanum tuberosum
(Irish potatoes), wool, wool tops, fats and oils (including lard, tallow, cotton-seed
oil, peanut oil, soybean oil and all other fats and oils), cottonseed meal, cotton-
seed, peanuts, soybeans, soybean meal, livestock, livestock products, and frozen
concentrated orange juice.
Id.
By 1974, futures trading was occuring in at least 14 non-food products, including
foreign currency, copper, and silver. Johnson, The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act:
Preemption as Public Policy, 29 VAND. L. REV. 1, 2-4 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Johnson].
6 See Hearings on H.R. 11955 Before the House Comm, on Agriculture, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
125-26 (1974) (statement of Arthur N. Economou, President, American Board of Trade, and
President, American Association of Commodity Traders) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on 11955].
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the Commodity Exchange Authority,' the agency charged with administering
CEA provisions, 8 prevented it from effectively regulating the increased
amount9 and complexity of commodities transactions. These two deficiencies
in the regulatory machinery of the CEA created a tremendous potential for
fraud in the commodities industry. 10
Dissatisfaction with the CEA' s regulatory reach led investors and other in-
dividuals to seek alternative forms of relief. The Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) brought injunctive suits to prevent violations of the antifraud
provisions and registration requirements of the securities laws by futures
dealers and other participants in the commodities industry." In addition, in-
jured investors instituted private actions under the securities laws to remedy
losses caused by fraudulent schemes." The approach of the SEC and private
parties in such suits was to seek a liberal definition of security and to use the
broad antifraud provisions of the securities acts to redress scandalous activity
in the commodities field. Their success depended upon the courts' willingness
to accept an expansion of the term security to include various commodity trans-
actions."
The Commodity Exchange Authority was a division of the United States Depart-
ment of Agriculture. Johnson, supra note 5, at 6 n.15.
8 Id.
9 In 1973, the twelve organized commodity exchanges in the United States registered a
trading volume having an estimated dollar volume of $520 billion. See Hewitt, supra note 3, at
295; Johnson, supra note 5, at 2. This figure portrayed a 400% increase in trading volume since
1964. See Johnson, supra note 5, at 2.
10 Two forms of fraudulent activity, in particular, appeared to pose potent dangers to
the stability of the futures markets. First, unscrupulous traders with interests in the underlying
cash markets for particular commodities used futures trading to manipulate markets for their
product. See, e.g., Leist v. Simplot, 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 21,051, at 24,160-64 and
24,170-71 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted sub fem. Heinold Commodities, Inc. v. Leist, 49 U.S.L.W.
3595 (Feb. 24, 1981); Deaktor v. L.D. Schreiber & Co., 479 F.2d 529 (7th Cir.), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Chicago Mercantile Exchange v. Deaktor, 414 U.S. 113 (1973). For example,
these traders would artificially raise or depress the prices for their products and force other in-
vestors to liquidate at the abnormal prices. See id. Second, devious brokers increasingly used
schemes, such as discretionary accounts and options, to defraud speculative investors — those
Who had no underlying interest in the cash market. See Leist, 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. at 24,170;
Long, supra note 2, at 87. For example, brokers had established Ponzi schemes whereby they
would pay their customers profits by using money received from subsequent purchasers of op-
tions — thereby causing monumental losses to these later purchasers. See, e.g. , Russo & Lyon,
The Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 47, 60-61
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Russo & Lyon]; Guttman, The Futures Trading Act of 1978: The Reaffir-
mation of CFTC-SEC CoordinatedJurisdiction Over Security/Commodities, 28 AM. U.L. REV. 1, 10 n.55
(1978).
" See, e.g. , SEC v. Commodity Options Intl, Inc., 553 F.2d 628 (9th Cir. 1977); SEC
v. American Commodity Exchange, Inc., 546 F.2d 1361 (10th Cir. 1976); SEC v. Continental
Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974); Glen-Arden Commodities, Inc. v. Costan-
tino, 493 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1974).
" Set, e.g., Berman v. Orimex Trading, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
Maheu v. Reynolds & Co., 282 F. Supp. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Sinva, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
" Courts varied in their willingness to allow an expanded definition of security, or
investment contract, to include commodities transactions. These courts applied the test for deter-
mining the presence of an investment contract as enunciated by the Supreme Court in SEC v.
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In 1974, Congress also responded to the regulatory deficiencies in the
commodities industry and enacted the Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion Act of 1974 (CFTCA)." In the CFTCA, Congress replaced the ineffective
Commodity Exchange Authority with an independent agency, the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), and vested this agency with exclusive
jurisdiction over futures trading." The provision granting exclusive jurisdic-
tion to the CFTC has jeopardized the ability of the SEC and private parties to
bring suits under the securities statutes. Indeed, this provision has explicitly
and permanently prevented the SEC from exercising any jurisdiction over
commodities transactions that fall within the purview of the CFTC's exclusive
jurisdiction. 16 Thus, even though certain commodity arrangements may also
W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). Thus, they inquired whether the transaction involved an
investment of money in a common enterprise from which one expects profits solely from the ef-
forts of others. Id. at 298-99. See FitzGibbon, What is a Security — A Redefinition Based on Eligibility
to Participate in the Financial Markets, 64 MINN. L. REV. 893 (1980). In general, futures and for-
wards contracts as well as bare commodities have been held not to be securities under the Howg
test. See, e.g., Consolo v. Hornblower & Weeks-Hemphill, Noyes, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 350 (N.D.
Ohio 1976) (futures contracts); Schwartz v. Bache & Co., Inc., 340 F. Supp. 995, 998 (S.D.
Iowa 1972) (forward contracts); Continental Marketing Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466, 468 (10th
Cir. 1967) (bare commodities). In contrast, a more controversial topic has been whether discre-
tionary trading accounts in commodity futures are securities. BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra
note 1, 5 4.6 (430-40), at 82.201. Those courts ignoring the common enterprise component of the
Howey test and focusing upon the dependence element have found unpooled accounts to be
securities. See, e.g., Johnson v. Arthur Espey, Shearson, Hammill & Co., 341 F. Supp. 764,
765-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). Similarly, courts reasoning that vertical commonality, or a contract
between a single investor and promoter, is sufficient to satisfy the common enterprise prong of
the Howey test have concluded that non-pooled discretionary accounts are securities. See, e.g. ,
SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 521-23 (5th Cir. 1974). In contrast,
those courts finding horizontal commonality, or a pooling of resources of pro-rata distribution of
profits among investors to be a requisite element of the Howry test have held that discretionary ac-
counts are not securities unless they are authorized to be pooled by the investors. See, e.g. ,
Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887
(1972). Pooled discretionary accounts, however, have been deemed to satisfy the common enter-
prise requirement under either interpretation. See, e.g., SEC v. Comstock Coin Co., [1964-1966
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,414 (D. Nev. 1964).
The case law for options is less clear although a trend is discernible. Most courts have
held that a naked option is a security. See BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 1, 5 4.6 (442), at
82.244; Long, The Naked Commodity Option Contract As a Security,  WM. & MARY L. REV, 211
(1973). In contrast, the issue of whether covered options are securities has been less directly
discussed by the courts. See BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 1, 5 4.6 (444-46), at 82.261.
Nevertheless, such options are probably not investment contracts since "[c]over — if shown to be
adequate — negates dependence . . ., negates horizontal common enterprise among customers,
and may negate vertical common enterprise between customers and sellers." Id. 5 4.6 (445), at
82.262; accord, Note, Federal Legislation for Commodity Option Trading; A Proposal, 47 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1418, 1432-37 (1974).
" Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (1974), as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-405, 92
Stat. 865 (1978) (codified at 7 U.S.C. SS 1-22 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)).
" 7 U.S.C. 5 2 (1976). See text at note 27 infra.
16 See Bromberg, Securities Law — Relationship to Commodities Law, 35 Bus. LAW. 787,
791 (1980); Johnson, supra note 5, at 31. See also Bromberg, Commodities Law and Securities Law —
Overlaps and Preemptions, 1 J. CORP. L. 217, 309 (1976) ("[T]he SEC and state agencies are ousted
from suing for fraud, failure to register, or other violations of the securities laws. They are thus
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be securities" and would otherwise be subject to the securities laws, Congress
chose to remove these transactions from SEC jurisdiction. In contrast to the ex-
press removal of SEC authority in the CFTCA, however, Congress did not ex-
pressly preclude individual investors from continuing to bring private actions
under the antifraud provisions of the securities laws. 18 Nevertheless, the fate of
such private remedies has been questioned. 19
This note will submit that private remedies for fraud under the securities
statutes should still be allowed in transactions where, in addition to a com-
modity, a security is found to exist," notwithstanding the CFTCA's exclusive
jurisdiction clause. First, the scope of this issue will be delimited through an
analysis of the CFTCA's provisions and examination of cases which have en-
countered the issue. Since the CFTCA is ambiguous regarding the continued
applicability of the securities statutes to commodity-security transactions, the
courts have not evolved a uniform approach to the problem. Next, analysis of
the legislative history of the CFTCA, policy considerations, and analogous in-
stances where a statutory framework has affected the applicability of rights
under other statutes will be presented. Examination of these topics reveals that
private actions for fraud under the securities statutes should be allowed to con-
tinue notwithstanding the CFTC's exclusive regulatory jurisdiction over the
commodities industry.
I. THE PROBLEM DELIMITED
A. CFTCA Exclusive Jurisdiction
In the CFTCA, Congress enacted a complete overhaul of the CEA. 2 '
First, Congress expanded the definition of commodity to include not only the
types of commodities originally listed in the CEA 22
 but also "all other goods
and articles, . 2nt-. 1- all services, rights, and interests in which contracts for
future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in . . . ."" This expansive
deprived of a power they have exercised against those discretionary accounts which have been
regarded as securities.").
" See note 13 supra.
18 See Bromberg, Securities Law — Relationship to Commodities Law, 35 BUS. LAW. 787,
795 (1980); Mullis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 1345,
1349-51 (D. Nev. 1980); see also Hewitt, supra note 3, at 319; Johnson, supra note 5, at 32;
Schroeder & Pollack, Commodities Regulation, 8 REV. OF SEC. REC. 937, 938 (1975) ("[E]ven
where the Commission's exclusive jurisdiction ousts another agency, a court might apply
substantive rules of law embodied in the statute applicable to the ousted agency, at least to the ex-
tent that the application of particular provisions does not require the exercise of the agency's
jurisdiction.").
19
 See text and notes at notes 34-61 infra.
20 This article does not examine which commodity transactions ought to be investment
contracts. For a thorough discussion of this issue, see BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 1,
4.6 (440-46), at 82.101-869. See note 13 supra. Rather, in discussing whether private actions
under the securities statutes should be retained for private commodities investors, it will be
assumed that the plaintiff can surmount the threshold obstacle of determining that the  -
tion in question includes a security. Consequently, reference will hereinafter be made to
"commodity-security transactions."
Leist v. Simplot, 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,051, at 24,166 (2d Cir. 1980),
cert. gfanted sub nom. Heinold Commodities, Inc. v. Leist, 49 U.S.L.W. 3595 (Feb. 24, 1981).
2$
	 note 4 supra.
22 7 U.S.C. 5 2 (1976).
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wording extended coverage to any commodity traded as a futures contract." In
addition to expanding such coverage, the CFTCA abolished the Commodity
Exchange Authority and replaced it with the CFTC, an independent
regulatory agency. This agency was equipped with broad rule-making authori-
ty to conduct investigations, to issue cease and desist orders, and to impose
civil and criminal sanctions." Further, the CFTCA authorized an elaborate
system of reparations proceedings before the CFTC." Finally, Congress vested
the CFTC with exclusive jurisdiction in regulating futures trading. The Act
states:
Provided, That the Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction with
respect to accounts, agreements . . . and transactions involving con-
tracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery, traded or executed
on a contract market .. . : And provided further, That, except as here-
inabove provided, nothing contained in this section shall (i) super-
sede or limit the jurisdiction at any time conferred on the Securities
and Exchange Commission or other regulatory authorities under the
laws of the United States or of any State, or (ii) restrict the Securities
and Exchange Commission and such other authorities from carrying
out their duties and responsibilities in accordance with such laws.
Nothing in this section shall supersede or limit the jurisdiction con-
ferred on courts of the United States or any State. 27
This section terminates SEC authority to regulate commodities transactions
falling within the CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of whether a securi-
ty also exists. 26 In contrast, private actions under the securities laws are no-
where similarly ousted." Instead, the court jurisdictional saving clause 30 may
be interpreted as an express retention of these causes of action. 3 ' Since a cause
of action, however, is not a jurisdictional power," the court jurisdictional sav-
ing clause, applied narrowly, does not clearly preserve the right of individuals
to bring suit under the fraud provisions of the securities laws in commodity-
security transactions. The CFTCA, therefore, is ambiguous because it does
not expressly retain or terminate the availability of these private remedies. The
existence of the court jurisdictional saving clause as well as the absence of any
language extinguishing private fraud actions under the securities statutes mili-
tates against a sweeping extinction of the applicability of securities concepts to
24 Id.; see Hewitt, supra note 3, at 301-02.
" See 7 U.S.C. 5 13 (1976); United States v. Abrahams, 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 21,007, at 23,927 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). See also Leist, 2 Comm. FUT. L. REP. at 24,194-95
(Mansfield, J., dissenting).
26 7 U.S.C. 18 (1976); see Leist, 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. at 24,180-81; Johnson, supra
note 5, at 40; Hewitt, supra note 3, at 322.
27 7 U.S.C. 5 2 (1976).
28 See note 16 supra.
29 See note 18 supra.
3° 7 U.S.C. 5 2 (1976).
31 See Johnson, supra note 5, at 32.
32 See Yates v, Island Creek Coal Co., 485 F. Supp. 995, 996 n.1 (W.D. Va. 1980)
("Whether plaintiffs have -an implied cause of action under the statute is not a question of juris-
diction . . . ."). See also Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 476 n.5 (1979).
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the commodities industry. Had Congress desired to eliminate the availability
of the private fraud remedies under the securities laws, a clause to that effect —
much like that terminating SEC power — could easily have been inserted."
Courts considering the issue, however, have rarely recognized this assertion.
B. Judicial Consideration
Since the enactment of the CFTCA, there has been only minimal judicial
consideration of the availability of private fraud remedies under the securities
statutes in cases involving commodity-security transactions. Although courts
addressing the issue have not presented elaborate analyses, four general
responses have emerged. Some courts have overlooked the potential abolition
of the applicability of the securities laws to commodities transactions and have
simply decided whether a security exists. Other courts have combined their
analyses of the existence of a security with an examination of the potential
ousting of the securities laws by the CFTCA and have concluded that a security
was not present in the commodity transaction before them. A third group has
held that the exclusive regulatory jurisdiction of the CFTC has rendered the
securities statutes wholly inapplicable. Finally, some courts have concluded
that with respect to private actions under the securities statutes, the CFTC's
regulatory jurisdiction is non-exclusive.
Courts in the first group have continued to canvass the pre-CFTCA dis-
pute" about whether certain commodity-security transactions are securities
without acknowledging the potential preemption of the securities statutes by
the exclusive jurisdiction clause." For example, in Curran v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc, , 36
 the Sixth Circuit was faced with actions for fraud
" In recent years, the Supreme Court has demonstrated a restrictive attitude towards
the implication of private rights of action. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v.
Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979). Judge Mansfield in his dissent in Leis', 2 COMM. FuT. L. REP. at
24,190 (Mansfield, J., dissenting), applied this limiting trend and concluded that private actions
under the CEA are no longer available since Congress, in amending the CEA by the CFTCA in
1974, failed to mention the existence of such implied actions. Id. at 24,194. Regardless of the cor-
rectness of Judge Mansfield's analysis of the availability of private actions under the CEA, his
reasoning is inapplicable to the issue of the continued availability of private actions under the
securities statutes in commodity-security transactions. Since Congress was amending the CEA,
and not the securities statutes, it had no occasion or need to reiterate its approval of implying
private actions under the securities laws. Indeed, it would distort greatly the legislative process
and the doctrine of implied rights to require Congress to preserve expressly implied remedies
under statutes other than the one it was amending. Thus, the availability of private remedies
under the securities statutes in commodity-security transactions should not be jeopardized
because Congress failed to demand unequivocally their retention during its consideration of the
CFTCA.
34 See note 13 supra.
35 See, e.g., Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216,
219-22 (6th Cir. 1980), petition for cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3053 (Aug. 9, 1980); Moody v. Bache &
Co., Inc., 570 F.2d 523, 525-27 (5th Cir. 1978); Meredith v. Conti Commodity Services, Inc., 2
COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) I 21,107, at 24,460-63 (D.D.C. 1980); Poplar Grove Pltg. & Ref.
Co. v. Bache, Halsey, Stuart, Inc., 465 F. Supp. 585, 588-91 (M.D. La. 1979); Consolo v.
Hornblower & Weeks-Hemphill, Noyes, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 447, 448-54 (MD, Ohio 1976); E.F.
Hutton & Co. v. Lewis, 410 F. Supp. 416, 417-20 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
36
 622 F.2d 216 (6th Cir. 1980), petition for cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3053 (Aug. 9, 1980).
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under the securities statutes by investors in discretionary trading accounts. 37
The court upheld the district court's dismissal of the investors' claims on the
grounds that the transactions in question did not involve securities." Nowhere
did the Sixth Circuit address the potential termination of the applicability of
the securities laws to commodity-security transactions.
The willingness of the court in Curran as well as other courts in this group
to discuss whether certain transactions in commodity futures are securities in-
dicates that they do not view the securities statutes as being ousted where an in-
vestment contract can be demonstrated. Since these courts have proceeded
directly to the merits, they evidently recognize the continued availability of
private actions under the securities statutes. In contrast, those courts con-
cluding that the CFTCA terminated the applicability of the securities statutes
have recognized that it is irrelevant whether a challenged futures transaction is
also an investment contract. 39
A second group of courts has addressed the issue of what effect the enact-
ment of the CFTCA had upon private actions under the securities statutes."
Their analysis, however, has succeeded only in further confusing the issue. For
example, in E.F. Hutton Ce Co., Inc. v. Schank, 4 ' the court examined whether a
discretionary trading account in commodity futures was a security within the
meaning of the federal securities laws." The court discussed the test for an
investment contract, or security," as well as the jurisdictional conflict," and
concluded that a security was not involved." In justifying its conclusion, this
court, as well as others in this group," emphasized both the ongoing jurisdic-
tional dispute and the existence of a comprehensive regulatory scheme under
the commodities statutes. Thus, without explicitly stating that the CFTCA re-
quires narrowing the definition of security they limited its meaning on just that
impetus.
Courts in the third group which have grappled with the impact of the
CFTCA upn private actions under the securities statutes have provided only
" Id. at 218-19.
" Id. at 220-24.
39 See, e.g., Bartels v. International Commodities Corp., 435 F. Supp. 865, 868-79 (D
Conn. 1977).
" See Fischer v. Rosenthal & Co., 481 F. Supp. 53, 54-55 (N.D. Tex. 1979); E.F. Hut-
ton & Co., Inc. v. Schank, 456 F. Supp. 507, 512-14 (D. Utah 1976).
41 456 F. Supp. 507 (D. Utah 1976).
49 Id. at 512.
" Id. at 512-13.
"' Id. at 513.
" Id. at 514.
" See, e.g., Berman v. Bache, Halsey, Stuart, Shields, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 311, 319-20
(S.D. Ohio 1979); E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc. v. Schank, 456 F. Supp. 507, 514 (D. Utah 1976)
("Congress did not intend that a commodities account be a security . .. ."). Cf. R.J. Hereley &
Son Co. v. Stotler & Co., 466 F. Supp. 345 (N.D. III. 1979), where the court, in considering
whether a private action exists for violations of the CEA, held that the exclusive jurisdiction of the
CFTC did not preclude such orivar ,- actions. The court concluded that "[T]he reference to the
Commission's exclusive jurisdiction was merely intended to remedy the confusion about whether
certain types of commodities transactions came within the definition of a security . . ." Id. at
347. In adopting the CFTCA, Congress expressly refused to narrow the definition of security in
this manner. See text and note at note 99 . infra.
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marginal insight into the problem, concluding quickly that the securities laws
were wholly inapplicable. In Bartels v. International Commodities Corp. , 47 for ex-
ample, the court summarily dismissed fraud claims brought under the
securities statutes in an alleged commodity-security transaction." The court
examined portions of the legislative history of the CFTCA which discussed the
intention to eliminate direct control by the SEC over the commodities in-
dustry" and concluded that ". . . Congress has made it clear that it does not
intend the securities laws to apply to commodity transactions."'" The Bartels
court, like others in this group, 51
 viewed the CFTC jurisdictional proviso as
prohibiting any relief from fraud under the securities laws in commodity-
security transactions. The court made no distinction between the explicit
removal of SEC jurisidiction and the court's implied extinguishing of private
investors' claims."
These courts in the third group apparently assumed that private actions
serve no purpose separate from regulation and are no different in nature than
regulatory actions. 53
 A fourth group of courts, however, has recognized a
distinction between private actions and regulatory provisions. 54 For example,
" 435 F. Supp. 865 (D. Conn. 1977).
45 Id. at 866 & n.l.
" Id. at 868-70, referring to H.R. REP. No. 93-975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1974);
H.R. REP. NO. 94-122, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1975).
50 Id. at 869.
" See, e.g., Fairchild Arabatziz & Smith, Inc. v. Prometco (Produce & Metals) Co.,
Ltd., 470 F. Supp. 610 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), where the court followed exactly the reasoning in
Bartels but offered no analysis. Fairchild involved a suit under the securities statutes for alleged
fraud regarding certain commodity options. Id. at 612. No insight beyond the recitation of the
Bartels decision was proffered in the court's dismissal of the securities claims. Id. at 614.
52
 In Gonzales v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, [Current) FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 97,561 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), the court endorsed the conclusion in Bartels and held that ex-
clusive CFTC regulatory authority necessarily dictates that both securities and commodities
statutory remedies were extinguished. The court then dismissed all of the plaintiff's claims for
fraud under both the CEA and the securities laws, id. at 97,944, concluding that the existence of
a " 'plethora of private actions,' " id. at 97,944 (quoting Berman v. Bache, Halsey, Stuart,
Shields, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 311, 323 (S.D. Ohio 1979)), would deprive the CFTC of the oppor-
tunity to build a strong regulatory policy. Finally, in Hofmayer v. Dean Witter & Co., Inc., 459
F. Supp. 733 (N.D. Cal. 1978), the court similarly offered cursory reasoning in dismissing a
plaintiff's fraud claims under both the securities statutes and the CEA. Id. at 735. The court
reasoned that such actions should not remain available due to "Congress' plainly stated intent to
have the Commodity Exchange Act, as amended, preempt the field of regulation of commodity
futures trading . . . ." Id, at 737.
" But see Witzel v. Chartered Systems Corp. of New York, Ltd., 490 F. Supp. 343 (D:
Minn. 1980), wherein the court remarked that "filt logically follows that the Act preempts
private actions based on federal or state statutory schemes which contemplate agency regulation
which would interfere with the CFTC's jurisdiction over commodity options." Id. at 347.
Therefore, since these actions do not trigger agency involvement, they should remain available.
See text and notes at notes 113-14 infra.
54 See, e.g., Navigator Group Funds v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 487 F. Supp.
416, 425-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (the court suggested that a private action for violation of the
securities statutes may still exist in a commodities situation); Searsy v. Commercial Trading
Corp., 437 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-10, A-11 (1-25-78) (Tex. 1977) (the court concluded
that private suits under state securities laws may be available).
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in Mullis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc. , 55 the court concluded
that although "there can be no private liability actions based on SEC rules or
regulations," suits under the securities statutes still would be allowed." The
court resolved, though curtly, that the legislative history clearly separated the
issues of agency and court jurisdiction and that allowing private actions under
the securities statutes was necessary to implement congressional intent." The
court in Mullis reasoned that just as Congress intended to provide the CFTC
with exclusive jurisdiction to achieve regulatory supremacy, it also intended
that private investors maintain and obtain maximum protection under both
federal statutes. Consequently, the jurisdiction of the courts to entertain
private actions under the securities statutes was preserved."
In SEC v. G. Weeks Securities, Inc. , 59 the court adopted a novel approach —
different from any of the judicial responses discussed in the four preceeding
groups — to the CFTCA jurisdictional issue. In order to avoid the jurisdic-
tional barrier, the court ruled that the commodity-security transaction in ques-
tion60 simply was not a commodity. 6 ' Regardless of the correctness of the
court's decision, its refusal to follow the trend of deciding that any transaction
involving both a commodity and a security will be labelled a commodity due to
the exclusive jurisdiction provisions of the CFTC is important. The court's
seeming disregard for congressional intent to incorporate a broad definition of
commodity might be better understood if viewed as evidence of frustration with
the excessively broad scope given the CFTC's exclusive control over any kind
of transaction even slightly resembling a commodity.
Court decisions on the availability of private commodities fraud actions
under the securities statutes have not resolved the issue. Instead, they have
ignored the potential jurisdictional obstacle or used congressional intent to ter-
minate SEC jurisdiction to extinguish private actions under the securities laws.
Although several courts have recognized the possibility of a distinction between
private actions and SEC power, their numbers and reasoning are insufficient to
surmount the growing controversy.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION CLAUSE
The language of the CFTCA regarding the fate of private actions for fraud
under the securities statutes is ambiguous. Thus, the legislative history must be
examined to discern congressional intent with respect to the retention of such
actions in commodity-security transactions. 62 The legislative history of the
CFTCA, much like the statute's provisions, nowhere reveals an express intent
" 492 F. Supp. 1345 (D. Nev. 1980).
56 Id. at 1350. See also text and notes at notes 113-14 infra.
" Id. at 1350-51, rearing to S. REP. No. 93-1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
[1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5843, 5848; H. CONF. REP. NO, 93-1383, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5894, 5897.
" 492 F. Supp. at 1351.
39 483 F. Supp. 1239 (W.D. Tenn. 1980).
69 Id. at 1241.
61 Id. at 1244-45.
62 Leist v. Simplot, 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) ¶ 21,051, at 24,180 (2d Cir. 1980),
cert. granted sub. nom. Heinold Commodities, Inc. v. Leist, 49 U.S.L.W. 3595 (Feb. 24, 1981).
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to terminate the continued availability of the securities statutes to private com-
modities investors." Therefore, since Congress failed to address this issue, an
understanding of legislative intent regarding these private actions must be
gleaned from a discussion of both the future role of the SEC in regulating
futures trading and the meaning of the court jurisdictional saving clause" in
section two of the CFTCA. It will be submitted that Congress, rather than ex-
pressing a desire to oust the availability of.private remedies for fraud under the
securities statutes, intended that they were to remain available to investors in
commodity-security transactions.
The overreaching goal of the CFTCA was "to amend the Commodity Ex-
change Act to strengthen the regulation of futures trading."" One form of
commodities regulation, however, was clearly terminated — the power of the
SEC to regulate any security transaction which also included a commodity
within the purview of the CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction. 66 This ejection of the
SEC from the field of commodities regulation occurred only after much discus-
sion. The House Committee on Agriculture, which initiated the 1974 amend-
ments, prepared a draft bill, 67 which not only expanded the definition of com-
modity and created a new and independent CFTC, but also contained an ex-
press protection of the jurisdiction of the SEC. Specifically, the bill stated:
Provided, That nothing contained in this Act shall preclude the
Securities and Exchange Commission from carrying out its duties
and responsibilities in accordance with the laws of the United States
under which it was established and currently functions."
No other agency was explicitly mentioned in the House committee bill nor is
there any evidence of the reasons behind this provision's inclusion. The SEC
itself neither testified at, nor submitted materials for, any of the hearings on the
CFTCA. 69 Witnesses opposed to SEC jurisdiction, including the Chicago
Board of Trade and several exchanges, however, quickly vocalized their
disfavor with any SEC involvement in commodities trading." Subsequently,
the House committee revised the bill, presumably to clarify its jurisdictional
provisions." This alteration, however, not only vested the CFTC with ex-
clusive jurisdiction but also expanded the jurisdictional saving clause to encom-
65 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 93-1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5843; H. CONF. REP. No. 93-1383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5897.
64 See text at note 27 supra.
65 Hearings on S. 2485, S. 2578, S. 2837 & H.R. 13113, Before the Senate Comm. on
Agriculture & Forestry, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 125 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on 13113).
66 See note 16 supra.
67 H.R. 11955, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
66 Hearings on 11955, supra note 6, at 348.
69 Johnson, supra note 5, at 10 & n.28.
7° Hearings on 11955, supra note 6, at 168 (statement of Chicago Board of Trade); id. at
105, 113-14 (statement of Chicago Mercantile Exchange); id. at 249, 253 (statement of New York
Coffee & Sugar Exchange, Inc.; Commodity Exchange, Inc.; New York Cocoa Exchange, Inc.);
id. at 322 (statement of Continental Grain Co.).
71 Johnson, supra note 5, at 11.
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pass other agencies." The committee report on the bill explained that under
this provision, the SEC and other agencies were divested of jurisdiction with
respect to any interests or transactions involving commodities, regardless of
whether the transactions otherwise came within the agency's jurisdiction."
The House report made no mention, however, about the continued applicabili-
ty of the statutory provisions under which these agencies operate.
At the Senate committee level, although similar attention was devoted to
limiting the power of the SEC, the fate of private actions under the securities
statutes was not discussed. In particular, the Senate version of the exclusive
jurisdiction clause, prepared by the Senate Agriculture & Forestry Committee,
inserted the phrase "except as hereinabove provided" 74 in an effort to incor-
porate the House committee report's limitations on the SEC's and other agen-
cies' powers. In addition, the Senate committee also inserted the court jurisdic-
tional saving clause providing that "[n]othing in this section shall supercede or
limit the jurisdiction conferred on courts of the United States or of any
State." 75
 Thus, the Senate committee appeared to extinguish SEC and agency
jurisdiction while introducing a new twist to the jurisdictional melee, namely,
the court jurisdictional saving clause." The exact scope of the court jurisdic-
72 Hearings on 13113, supra note 65, at 140-41. The House Committee's revision stated:
Provided, That the Commission [CFTC] shall have exclusive jurisdiction of trans-
actions dealing in, resulting in, or relating to contracts of sale of a commodity for
future delivery, traded or executed on a domestic board of trade or contract
market or on any other board of trade, exchange, or market: And provided further,
That nothing herein contained shall supersede or limit the jurisdiciton at any time
conferred on the Securities Exchange Commission or other regulatory authorities
under the laws of the United States or restrict the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission and such other authorities from carrying out their duties and respon-
sibilities in accordance with the laws of the United States.
Id.
" See Johnson, supra note 5, at 12.
" S. REP. NO. 93-1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5843, 5870.
7 S
 Id.
76
 The origin of this express retention of court jurisdiction appears to be testimony of
Representative Peter W. Rodino, Chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary, before
the Senate Agriculture & Forestry Committee. Hearings on 13113, supra note 65, at 257-62. He
emphasized the advisability of ensuring that court jurisdiciton to hear contract and commercial
law claims and to review CFTC decisions be preserved. Id. at 260. Chairman Rodino also
stressed the importance of defining the extent to which other statutory provisions, such as the
antitrust laws, were to apply. Id. Chairman Rodino commented:
In addition, this double proviso could possibly be read as an attempt to oust
even the federal courts of jurisdiction. The first proviso confers "exclusive juris-
diction. The first proviso confers "exclusive jurisdiction" on the Commission for
commodity transactions. Exceptions to this exclusive jurisdiction are carved out in
the second proviso without, however, referring to federal district courts.
If it appears advisable to retain rather than to delete the double proviso of
Section 201(B) . . it would seem reasonable to amend the second proviso appro-
priately to define the jurisdiction, including antitrust jurisdiction, of federal courts
for commodity transactions.
Id. Chairman Rodino's suggestions obviously were acted upon by the Senate committee.
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tional saving clause, however, was defined neither by the Senate report nor by
committee members' testimony." The report clarified that agencies no longer
would exercise jurisdiction over any transaction falling within the scope of the
CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction. 78 Nevertheless, the language of the report and
the Senate' sTevised text of section 201(B) did not eliminate the applicability of
the statutes under which these agencies operate nor the vitality of private ac-
tions pursuant to these statutes." Instead, the court jurisdicitonal saving clause
implicitly suggests that courts may continue to exercise jurisdiction over claims
which they previously had jurisdiction to hear.
In debate on the bill before the full Senate, Chairman Talmadge shed
light on the purposes behind the court jurisdictional saving clause. He com-
mented:
In establishing this Commission, it is the committee's intent to give
it exclusive jurisdiction over those areas delineated in the act. This
will assure that the affected entities — exchanges, traders,
customers, et cetera — will not be subject to conflicting agency rul-
ings. However, it is not the intent of the committee to exempt per-
sons in the futures trading industry from existing laws or regulations
such as the antitrust laws. . . . 8°
Chairman Talmadge thus assured the Senate that existing laws were to remain
applicable. Although he recites only the antitrust laws by name, his use of the
words "such as" strongly suggests that other provisions, including the
securities statutes, were also to retain force. Another comment made by Chair-
man Talmadge on the Senate floor suggests that the court jurisdictional saving
clause had a more limited purpose than preserving private rights of action. He
remarked:
" Cf. Leist v. Simplot, 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) I 21,051 at 24,183 (2d Cir.
1980), cert. granted sub nom. Heinold Commodities, Inc. v. Leist, 49 U.S.L.W. 3595 (Feb. 24,
1981) ("While Chairman Rodino's remarks were focussed on antitrust jurisdiction, they were
not limited to that. He argued generally that federal courts retained jurisdiction, and cited anti-
trust jurisdiction as an example supporting this view. Other objections to the exclusive jurisdic-
tion provisions of the House bill were explicitly addressed to the preservation of private rights of
action,").
7" H. CONF. REP, NO. 93-1383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5894, 5897. The Report stated:
The House bill provides for exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission [CFTC]
over all futures transactions. However, it is provided that such exclusive jurisdic-
tion would not supersede or limit the jurisdiciton of the Securities and Exchange
Commission or other regulatory authorities.
The Senate Committee amendment retains the provision of the House bill but
adds three clarifying amendments. The clarifying amendments make clear that (a)
the Commission's jurisdiction over futures contract markets or other exchanges is
exclusive and includes the regulation of commodity accounts, commodity trading
agreements, and commodity options; (b) the Commission's jurisdiction, where ap-
plicable, supersedes State as well as Federal agencies; and (c) Federal and State
courts retain their respective jurisdictions.
Id.
" See text and note at note 18 supra.
8° 120 CONG. REC. 30459 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Talmadge).
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The vesting in the Commission of the authority to have ad-
ministrative law judges and apply a broad spectrum of civil and
criminal penalties is likewise not intended to interfere with the courts
in any way. It is hoped that giving the Commission this authority
will somewhat lighten the burden upon the courts, but the entire ap-
peal process and the right of final determination by the courts are ex-
pressly preserved."
While it is possible that this statement indicates that the jurisdictional saving
clause was intended to preserve judicial review of agency action and that the
reparations proceedings before the CFTC were intended to be the exclusive
remedies for defrauded investors,H 2 such an interpretation ignores Senator
Talmadge's choice of words. Indeed, in Leist v. Simplot83
 Judge Friendly recog-
nized the significance of Chairman Talmadge's language. He noted that if the
reparations procedure were intended to be the only remedy then "it certainly-
would lighten the burden on the courts of appeals" but emphasized that "the
Senator spoke in terms of 'hope' and lightening the burden 'somewhat' — as if
reparations were an alternative he hoped had been made attractive enough to
sway some aggrieved traders away from the courts."" Hence, Chairman
Talmadge's comments support the continued applicability of private rights
under the securities statutes.
The Conference committee's discussion of the court jurisdictional saving
clause sheds further light upon the ramifications of its inclusion. The Senate
version, with a minor exception, prevailed at Conference." The Conference
report" explained the Conference committee's adoption of the Senate version
of the measure, specifically addressing a clause in the Senate bill eliminating
the last sentence of section 4c of the Commodity Exchange Act," which had ex-
pressly reserved the applicability of state law. To explain the Conference com-
mittee's elimination of continued state authority the report emphasized the im-
portance of federal supremacy in commodities regulation. It stated:
Under the exclusive grant of jurisdiction to the Commission, the
authority in the Commodity Exchange Act (and the regulations
issued by the Commission) would preempt the field insofar as
futures regulation is concerned. Therefore, if any substantive State
law regulating futures trading was contrary to or inconsistant with
" Id.
82 See, e.g., Leist, 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. at 24,212 n.19 (Mansfield, J., dissenting);
Johnson, supra note 5, at 32-33.
" 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,051 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted sub corn. Heinold
Commodities, Inc. v. Leist, 49 U.S. L.W. 3595 (Feb. 24, 1981).
84 Id, at 24,182 (emphasis in original),
8' The only deviation was that the Conference committee accepted the House commit-
tee's extension of CFTC exclusive jurisdiction to include all domestic and foreign commodity
markets rather than the Senate's narrower limitation to "contract markets." Johnson, supra note
5, at 17.
86 H. CONF. REP. No. 1383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [197 4] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 5894,
" Id. at 5897.
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Federal law, the Federal law would govern. In view of the broad
grant of authority to the Commission to regulate the futures trading
industry, the Conferees do not contemplate that there will be a need
for any supplementary regulation by the States."
Notably, the report did not advocate a similar fate for federal statutory provi-
sions which might affect commodities transactions. Rather, the report empha-
sized that "federal," and not state, law will govern. This interpretation is in
accord with Chairman Talmadge's desire to insure that other substantive
federal laws would remain applicable. 89
The Conference committee's version of H.R. 13113 was presented to the
House floor in October of 1974. At that time, Representative Poage, Chairman
of the Conference committee, offered comments focusing upon the future role
of the SEC in regulating commodities futures. 9° Chairman Poage, however,
did not discuss the implications of the court jurisdictional saving clause.
Although he indicated the pending SEC investigations against abuses not
previously covered by the CEA would be allowed to continue, he did not rely
upon the court jurisdictional saving clause to buttress his remarks. Instead, he
explained that a separate provision, section 412, 9 ' had been included to insure
that all pending proceedings and investigations would continue. 92 Since,
according to Chairman Poage, section 412 was introduced to preserve pending
agency actions, the purpose of the court jurisdictional saving clause cannot be
narrowed to this concern. Furthermore, although Chairman Poage indicated
that future actions by state and federal agencies including the SEC would be
precluded under the CFTCA, he did not extend this analysis to suits brought
by private individuals. Hence, Chairman Poage's construction eliminating
agency proceedings, other than pending suits, should not be extended to ter-
minate the availability of private actions under the securities statutes.
u Id.
" See text at note 80 supra.
" 120 CONG. REC. 34737 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Poage).
9 ' Id. The section 4a note, codifying section 412 of Pub. L. 93-463, 7 U.S.C.	 4a
(1976), provides: "Pending proceedings under existing law shall not be abated by reason of any
provision of this Act ... but shall be disposed of pursuant to the applicable provisions of the
Commodity Exchange Act, as amended .. . , in effect prior to the effective date of this
Act . . . ." Id.
" 120 CONG. REC. 34737 (1947) (remarks of Rep. Poage). Chairman Poage com-
mented:
In addition, the conferees wished to make clear that nothing in the act would
supersede or limit the jurisdiction presently conferred on courts of the United
States or any State. This act is remedial legislation designed to correct certain
abuses which Congress found to exist in areas that will now come within the juris-
diction of the CFTC. Congress was aware that there have been ongoing efforts by
various State and Federal regulators to prevent some of these abuses. Accordingly,
sectin 412 was included in the bill to make clear that all pending proceedings, in-
cluding ongoing investigations, as well as court proceedings, should continue un-
abated by any provision of the act . . . We would expect that those investigations
will continue and any proceedings resulting therefrom will not be affected by the
passage of this act.
Id.
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A final allusion to the meaning of the court jurisdictional saving clause can
be found in the report of the Senate Agriculture & Forestry Committee 93 on
H.R.J. Res. 335. 94
 This joint resolution was prepared by the House and the
Senate, after the CFTCA was signed into law," to extend the CFTC's dead-
lines to accomplish certain statutory mandates. 96
 The Senate report stated
specifically that state criminal antifraud laws were to remain applicable to com-
modities transactions:
The Committee realizes that many fraudulent schemes are devised
to prey on the unsuspecting and unsophisticated investor. In many
case, [sic] these schemes purport to deal in commodities trading.
The States are encouraged to continue to utilize their criminal anti-
fraud statutes to discourage such schemes."
Although these state criminal antifraud provisions are mentioned expressly in
the legislative history while the federal securities statutes are not, this omission
is not dispositive of the fate of private actions under the securities statutes for
two reasons. First, since the Conference committee's report expressly provided
that state law was preempted," Congress may have felt compelled to refer
specifically to the retention of the state antifraud statutes to ensure their con-
tinued applicability. In contrast, there was no express termination of the ap-
plicability of the federal statutory actions. Therefore, Congress probably
perceived no need to mention explicitly their perservation. Second, since these
state criminal antifraud statutes require the utilization of state agency enforce-
ment mechanisms, their preemption, in light of the grant of exclusive regula-
tory authority to the CFTC, was probably certain to occur absent a clear state-
ment to the contrary. In contrast, the private remedies for fraud under the
securities statutes do not activate any agency proceedings. Thus, their termina-
tion is not required.
Other considerations supporting the continued availability of private ac-
tions under the securities laws appear in the legislative history of the CFTCA
as well. For example, Congress refused to adopt several proposals that would
have expressly denied the applicability of securities concepts to the com-
modities industry. 99
 These proposals provided that what is a commodity cannot
also be a security. Their adoption would have extinguished both the SEC's and
93 S. REP. No. 94-73, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 143, 147.
94
 H.R.J. Res. 335, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 77.
95
 On October 24, 1974, the text of H.R. 13113, as prepared by the Conference com-
mittee, was signed into law by the President. Pub. L. No. 93-463 (1974). Set Johnson, supra note
5, at 19. Although the Act was to be operational on April 21, 1975, there was a delay in naming
candidates to serve as commissioners of the CFTC. 121 CONG. REC. 9243 (1975).
96 S. REP. No. 94-73, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1975) U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 143, 147 (1975).
97 Id.
96 See text at note 88 supra.
99 Set Hearings on 13113, supra note 65, at 715 (statement of Harold J. Heinold, Presi-
dent, Heinold Commodities, Inc., on futures and managed or discretionary accounts), 751
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private parties abilities to sue under the securities statutes. By not pursuing this
course, Congress indicated that securities concepts were to retain relevance
and that private remedies under the securities laws were to continue. Another
example in the legislative history supporting the survival of private actions
under the securities statutes emerges from the prevalence of these private ac-
tions prior to the adoption of the CFTCA. As Judge Friendly commented in
Leist v. Simplot: "Congress was not only aware of the implied right of action
under the CEA in 1974, . . . but surely was also aware of the private right of
action recognized in the analogous field of securities regulation. 7710o The
specific language of the CFTCA provides another example supporting the con-
tinued applicability of the securities laws. The CFTCA now grants exclusive
jurisdiction to the CFTC over accounts, agreements, and transactions, but not
over individuals."' The statutory language thus supports the conclusion that
persons were not to be exempted from existing statutory provisions.'" Finally,
since the private rights of action under the securities statutes in commodity-
security transactions existed prior to the enactment of the CFTCA, a strong
argument exists that their extinction occurred only if Congress manifested an
explicit intention to eliminate them.'"
Thus, the legislative history of the CFTCA does not militate against al-
lowing private actions for fraud under the securities laws to continue to be
available to investors in commodity-security transactions. Instead, comments
calling for preservation of the applicability of federal statutes and state general
antifraud provisions support the conclusion that the securities actions for fraud
ought also to survive the enactment of the CFTCA. Although SEC power was
terminated, the Congress which devised the CFTCA did not project a similar
destiny for private remedies under the securities laws. Therefore, these actions
should be upheld by the courts.'"
IV. PRIVATE SECURITIES REMEDIES AND CFTC JURISDICTION:
COMPATIBLE GOALS
While the legislative history of the CFTCA supports the proposition that
private investors should retain the ability to initiate damage actions for fraud
(statement of M. Martin Rom, Chairman of the Board, International Precious Metals Corp., on
futures, forwards, commodity margin accounts, and other commodity investments), 796 (state-
ment of Dr. Henry G. Jarecki, Chairman of the Board, Mocatta Metals Corp., on futures and
options). See also BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 1, $ 4.6 (471) at 82.384.
Leist, 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) at 24,169 n.14.
7 U.S.C. 5 2 (1976).
1 °2 See Schroeder & Pollack, Commodities Regulation, 8 REV. OF SEC. REG. 937, 938
(1975).
183 See Hewitt, supra note 3, at 319 & n.161, 324 (citing H. HART & A. SACKS, THE
LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING & APPLICATION OF LAW 1412-13 (10th ed.
1958)); BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 1, 5 4.6 (470-86), at 82.381-431. See also United
States v. Abrahams, 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,007, at 23,926-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(concluding that repeal by implication was not favored); accord, Train v. Colorado Public Interest
Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 24 (1976).
1 " Cf. Leist, 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. at 24,181 ("It is just as much 'judicial legislation'
for a court to withdraw a remedy which Congress expected to be continued as to improvise one
that Congress never had in mind.").
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under the securities laws, policy arguments also support this conclusion. The
lack of a threat to CFTC power, the usefulness of the securities laws in this con-
text, and the similarity between the statutory schemes reveals that retaining
private securities suits is a goal compatible with the CFTCA grant of exclusive
jurisdiction. The CFTCA appears to have four dominant purposes: expanding
the definition of commodity to encompass nonagricultural interests; 105 replac-
ing the ineffective Commodity Exchange Authority with a strong, independent
federal agency, the CFTC; 1 °8 strengthening and modernizing regulatory con-
trols of the industry; 1 Q 7 and, eliminating the mounting potential for defrauding
investors in the futures markets. 108 None of these goals standing alone appears
to have been the sine qua non of the CFTCA to the Congress which passed it.
Nevertheless, the intention to centralize the regulation of commodity futures in
the CFTC and the desire to increase available remedies for defrauded investors
appear to have been the principal concerns to Congress. 109 Private actions for
fraud under the securities statutes, however, do not necessarily conflict with
such goals of exclusive regulatory jurisdiction and more extensive remedies. In-
deed, they clearly further the purpose of eliminating fraud in the commodities
industry. To the extent that private damage actions may be found to transgress
the boundaries of the CFTC's jurisdiction, the desirability of strengthening in-
vestor remedies in the commodities industry outweighs the interest in giving
the CFTC absolute authority to dictate all futures trading policies."o
1 °' See Hewitt, supra note 3, at 296; S. REP. NO. 93-1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted
in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5843, 5870.
106 See generally Johnson, supra note 5. See also Hewitt, supra note 3, at 296-98.
107 See generally Johnson, supra note 5. See also Leist, 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. at 24,167 and
24,180.
108 See Leist, 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. at 24,186 ("In the case of the [Commidity Ex-
change Act] we have found abundant evidence in the legislative hsitory that the intent to protect
traders in the commodity futures was the dominant purpose (of the CFTCA) . . . ."); Note, The
Commodities Game Has A New Referee, 52 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 438, 459 (1975). The Note sug-
gested:
the argument . . . that Congress did not intend to deprive private persons of a
remedy is clearly a stronger one now . . . . The legislative history of the CFTCA
indicates that the purpose of Congress was to further protect the exchange
customer, not to deprive him of protection. The proviso in the Act that the juris-
diction of state and federal courts is not superseded suppons the presumption that
the customer was intended to be further protected by the Act.
Id. at 459 (footnotes omitted). See also Ames v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 567
F.2d 1174, 1179 (2d Cir. 1977) ("the Act [the original CEA and the CFTCA] itself . . . was
[enacted' for the protection of investors"); Note, Private Rights of Action for Commodity Futures In-
vestors, 55 B.U. L. REV. 804, 826 (1975) ("the statute's clear purpose — to increase existing pro-
tection of commodities futures investors").
See notes 106 & 108 supra.
"° See BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 1, 5 4.6 (482), at 82.424:
Application of securities fraud standards to commodity investments imposes a
compliance burden on the commodity industry — to the undetermined extent that
securities fraud standards are higher than or different from commodity fraud
standards. . . . But we think this is outweighed by the desirability of affording
commodity investors the benefit of the more fully developed securities law stand-
ards when their commodity invstment are securities by traditional tests.
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A. Private Actions vs. Exclusive Regulatory Jurisdiction
The Senate Report for the 1978 amendments to the CEA stated that the
CFTC "was created in order to assure that a single expert agency would have
the responsibility for developing a coherent regulatory program encompassing
futures trading and related activities."'" Maintaining private actions under
the securities statutes does not conflict with this specific purpose of exclusive
regulatory jurisdiction." 2
 The first reason for the lack of conflict is that only ac-
tions for fraud under the securities statutes and not those for failure to register
would remain available. 13 Since the registration actions originate from a re-
quirement that entails the activation of SEC machinery, they were necessarily
extinguished with the grant of exclusive regulatory jurisdiction to the CFTC.
Just as the SEC has no authority either to regulate traders if they do register, or
to compel registration, a private party likewise cannot bring suit for failure to
comply with the registration provisions. The regulatory machinery of the SEC
is not implicated, however, in private actions for fraud. Accordingly, no SEC
conflict with the CFTC will result from such actions.'"
The distinctive nature of fraud issues as compared with regulatory con-
cerns supports the continued availability of private actions under the securities
statutes. The basis of a defrauded investor's challenge is not that he desires ad-
ditional or different regulatory practices. It is that he be compensated for injury
caused by illegal conduct. Such a concern is adjudicatory in nature, not
regulatory, and is consequently in less need of exclusive control by a single
agency or a single statutory framework." 5
 The fraud provisions are thus
'" S. REP. NO. 95-850, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2087, 2101.
1"2 This note does not discuss in detail the extent to which commodity transactions are or
ought to be securities. See text and note at note 13 supra. Instead, the analysis will focus upon to
what extent the securities laws should apply, where a security exists, to commodity-security
transactions.
113 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 1, S 4.6 (482), at 82.424 (". . . Senate
witnesses urging exclusive jurisdiction . . . almost uniformly expressed concern about liability
for failure to register under the securities laws, but none expressed concern about being subjected
to securities fraud standards"); Bromberg, Securities Law — Relationship to Commodities Law, 35
BUS. LAW. 787, 795 n.26 (1980).
' 4
 It has been suggested that the exclusive jurisdiction clause of the CFTCA requires
that only the securities statutes and not SEC rules or regulations remain applicable in private ac-
tions under the securities laws. See Mullis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 492
F. Supp. 1345, 1350 (D. Nev. 1980); Bromberg, Securities Law — Relationship to Commodities Law,
35 BUS. LAW. 787, 795 n.28 (1980). A valid distinction may be drawn, however, between rules
interpreting statutory provisions that are of general applicability, such as 17 C.F.R. 5 240.10b-5,
and rules or regulations more specific in nature adopted pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 78w(a) (1976).
Courts may consider broad interpretative SEC rules in adjudicating liability under the antifraud
provisions of the securities acts; however, they would not be bound by the rules' standards due to
Congress' decision to prevent the SEC from exercising control over futures trading. Further-
more, courts are probably obligated, in light of the CFTCA's exclusive jurisdiction provision, to
disregard any pronouncements by the SEC that attempt to create special classes of rules for the
conduct of commodity-security transactions. This requirement evolves from Congress' deter-
mination that the SEC may not regulate futures trading; therefore, it may not do indirectly —
through rulemaking authority — what it cannot do directly.
See text and notes at notes 120-21 infra.
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distinguishable from the registration and other managerial provisions of the
securities statutes. Similarly, the adjudicatory nature of antifraud actions sug-
gest that reliance upon an exclusive statutory framework was not intended by
Congress. While it is evident that Congress sought to promote administrative
efficiency through one agency in enacting the CFTCA," 6
 Congress did not
simultaneously intend to limit the reach of antifraud provisions of other legisla-
tion. Indeed, it expressly reserved the applicability of state criminal fraud
statutes while preempting many other state statutory provisions."' Since Con-
gress retained the applicability of all federal statutes to the commodities in-
dustry,"° the availability of the antifraud provisions of the securities laws
should not be abolished. To do so would allow defendants to escape liability
under the securities accounts. Such action would clearly thwart the goal of the
CFTCA and the purposes of the federal securities laws.
The need for judicial resolution of fraud issues, as distinguished from
other regulatory concerns, has been recognized both by Congress and the
CFTC in other situations. The Securities Act of 1933 allows certain securities
to be exempted from the registration requirements thereunder," 9
 but such
securities remain subject to the antifraud provisions of the securities acts.
Likewise the CFTC has acknowledged the necessity for and validity of judicial
resolution of fraud issues — notwithstanding its exclusive regulatory jurisdic-
tion.' 20
 In furtherance of this policy, the CFTC has declared that it would not
intervene in fraud actions instituted in federal court.'" Thus, within both the
securities and commodities fields, private actions for fraud have retained im-
portance independent of surrounding regulatory procedures. Accordingly,
maintaining private actions for fraud under the securities statutes in
commodity-security transactions can allow fraud issues, appropriate for
"6 See generally S. REP. NO. 93-1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5843; H. CoNF. REP. No. 93-1383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in (1974]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5894.
117 See text and notes at 88 & 97 supra.
"6
 See text and note at note 80 supra.
119 15 U.S.C.	 77c(b) (1976).
120
 41 Fed. Reg. 18,471, 18,472 (1976).
" 1 17 C.F.R. 5 12.21(a)(7) (1980). See Leist v. Simplot, 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH)
21,051 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted sub nom. Heinold Commodities, Inc. v. Leist, 49 U.S.L.W.
3595 (Feb. 24, 1981), for a comprehensive discussion of the issues relating to the existence or
nonexistence of private remedies under the CEA. See also Rivers v. Rosenthal & Co., 2 Comm.
FUT. L. REP, (CCH) 21,128 (5th Cir. 1980). If the Supreme Court were to find that private
remedies under the CEA survived the enactment of the CFTCA then the argument that private
remedies do not derogate from the CFTC's exclusive regulatory jurisdiction is strengthened. The
private actions for fraud under the CEA serve essentially the same purpose in commodities trans-
actions as do the securities private actions in commodity-security transactions. Thus, if the
Supreme Court were to conclude that the CEA actions did not significantly interfere with the ex-
clusive regulatory jurisdiciton of the CFTC then a similar conclusion regarding the securities
statutes would become more palatable. Valid arguments exist, however, that the CEA actions in-
fringe less extensively upon the CFTC's authority than do actions under the securities statutes
since the CEA's standards and the CFTC's interpretation thereof govern in the private actions
for fraud under the CEA. Nevertheless, both types of private remedies open the gates for judicial
resolution of issues in manners different than the CFTC might have chosen. Thus, the private
remedies under the CEA are not substantially less intrusive than those under the securities laws.
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judicial resolution, to be litigated without undermining the CFTC's position as
the only regulatory agency.
Thus, private remedies for fraud under the securities statues in
commodity-security transactions would not detract significantly from the
CFTC's power to exercise exclusive regulatory jurisdiction. Issues appropriate
for agency determination, such as the nature and extent of registration require-
ments, would remain in the CFTC's sole control. In contrast, the determina-
tion of particular investors' fraud remedies would be subject to the authority of
the courts as well as the CFTC.
B. Securities Statutes' Unique Value
The availability of private actions under the securities laws, whether or
not such rights are available under the CEA,I 22 will help effectuate the congres-
sional goals of eliminating fraud and strengthening remedies for defrauded in-
vestors. Suits by individuals under the securities statutes increase the number
of enforcement actions and help decrease the agencies' caseload. Aitlough the
reparations proceedings before the CFTC are vast improvements over previous
remedies under the CEA, one agency simply cannot effectively remedy all of
the fraudulent undertakings in the famously scandalous commodities industry.
Furthermore, there may be some dissatisfaction with the limited reach of the
CFTC's reparations procedures. For instance, in Leist v. Simplot, Judge Friend-
ly seized on this problem as an indication of the desirability of allowing other
remedies.'" These deficiencies in agency remedies are compounded by the
CFTC's less than aggressive enforcement practices.'" Consequently, extin-
guishing private remedies would augment the potential for unremedied
fraudulent activity, thereby dissenting one of the major purposes of the
CFTCA.
If a private action were recognized under the CEA, the arguments for re-
taining the private remedies under the securities statutes would then focus
upon subtle but important variations between the securities and commodities
laws. The securities statutes and the CEA are replete with similarities.' 25
Nevertheless, in some circumstances the securities laws provide more extensive
remedies for the defrauded investor.' 26 Therefore, investors in commodity-
122 See note 121 supra.
120 Leist, 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP, at 24,181.
124 See Bromberg, Securities Law — Relationship to Commodities Law, 35 Bus. LAW. 787, 788
(1980); Johnson, supra note 5, at 42 (commenting upon criticism before 1976).
"2 See BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 1, S 4.6 (460-69), at 82.361-73; Bromberg,
Securities Law — Relationship to Commodities, 35 Bus. LAW. 787, 788-90 (1980).
126 One noteworthy variation between the two statutory frameworks is that the securities
laws provide general service of process and venue sections, while the CEA provides none.
BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 1, 5 4.6 (462), at 82.373. Such provisions interfere in no
way the CFTC's power to define commodity trading policy since they do not address substantive
concerns.
The securities statutes' disclosure standards present potential differences as well. Id. S
4.6 (462), at 82.367-71 (contrasting the securities statutes' elaborate policies with the CEA's
silence regarding disclosure requirements). Although the CFTC has indicated that nondisclosure
may serve as a basis for fraud or deceit, 40 Fed. Reg. 26504-06 (1975), it has intimated that due
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security transactions which are found to be securities ought to be accorded the
most effective remedy. While an argument can be marshalled that discrepan-
cies existing between the CEA and the securities statutes are the product of
distinctions between the commodities and securities industries and, therefore,
ought to remain,' 27 this argument is inapplicable to commodity-security trans-
actions meeting the traditional test for a security.'" As one commentator
points out with respect to commodity option schemes:
[T]he people who are investing in this type of contract [options] are
not the normal commodity trader who has a reasonable knowledge
of the commodity market and its operation. Instead the people
drawn to the commodity option schemes are the totally unsophisti-
cated investor who is merely seeking an investment for his money
and has no knowledge of the commodity market. Likewise most of
the commodity option dealers are not normally commodity traders.
Most of the firms . .. came from other branches of the securities
business because of the easy pickings in a new and virtually
unregulated area of investment. The regulatory scheme of the Com-
modity Exchange Act while it does have an anti-fraud section similar
to that found in the securities act, which has been construed to give
rise to a private cause of action, is not designed to provide this class
of unskilled investors with the information that they need to make an
intelligent investment decision in this area.'"
Thus, it would appear that investors in these commodity-security transactions
are comparable in their level of sophistication and knowledge to those who in-
vest in securities. Furthermore, the dealer firms are well-versed in securities
policies. Since the investors, the dealers and the transactions themselves are at-
tuned to securities concepts, allowing the securities statutes to remain appli-
to differences between the commodities and securities markets, the role of nondisclosure in com-
modities may not approximate the degree of stringency required in the securities statutes. 40
Fed. Reg. 26505 (1975). Since the securities statutes' disclosure standards would apply only
where a security exists, their invocation would be appropriate in these instances. Otherwise,
shrewd traders could attach nominal commodity interests to securities accounts in order to shield
themselves from the more extensive disclosure requirements of the securities acts.
Another relevant difference between the securities and commodities laws is that investors
invoking the securities statutes have a guaranteed right of court access notwithstanding the ex-
istence of an arbitration agreement. E. F. Hutton & Co., Inc. v. Schank, 456 F. Supp. 507, 513
(D. Utah 1976); Hewitt, supra note 3, at 323. In contrast, predispute arbitration agreements can
be binding under the CEA. Hewitt, supra note 3, at 323. Although these agreements can serve as
"quick and inexpensive resolution of disputes," id. at 323, even the CFTC has acknowledged the
danger that submission to arbitration may be involuntary and that rights may be waived
unknowlingly. 41 Fed. Reg. 27526 (1976). Since many investors in hybrid commodity-security
accounts are unsophisticated and unknowledgeable in investment practices, maintaining the
availability of the securities actions would help to safeguard these investors' rights. Other rele-
vant differences between the securities and commodities standards are discussed in BROMBERG &
LOWENFELS, supra note 1, § 4.6 (460.69), at 82.361-73.
in
 Hewitt, supra note 3, at 321-23.
128 See note 13 supra.
129
 Long, supra note 2, at 130 (footnotes omitted).
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cable would not result in an imposition of foreign and ill-fitted inventions."°
Consequently, in those instances where an investor has been defrauded in a
commodity-security transaction which comports with the requirements for a
security, the more extensive remedies under the securities statutes"' ought to
remain available.
C. Analogous Statutory Frameworks
In addition to legislative history and policy considerations, another argu-
ment supporting the availability of the securities statutes can be found through
analogy to other statutes. Although such comparisons reveal no final answer to
the problem of retaining private actions under the securities statutes in
commodity-security transactions, the ambiguity of the CEA in this respect is
highlighted. An analysis of one court's interpretation of the effect of the
CFTCA upon federal statutes, other than the securities laws, will be offered
first. Subsequently other statutory frameworks wherein Congress has retained
or terminated recognized rights and remedies will be examined. All of these ex-
amples lend support to the conclusion that the private remedies under the
securities laws should continue to apply to commodity-security transactions.
A salient example of the effect of one federal statutory framework upon
_another is that of the impact of the CFTCA upon the mail and wire fraud
statutes.' 32 A federal district court recently considered that issue in United States
v. Abrahams.'" The defendant in Abrahams was charged with violating the mail
and wire fraud statutes. The government alleged that the defendant, having
devised multiple schemes to defraud the public,'" then used the mails and
wires to place orders for commodity options and to send confirmations of those
orders.'" The defendant argued that the granting of exclusive jurisdiction to
the CFTC precluded prosecution under other federal statutes.'"
The court approached the issue with a presumption that the applicability
of federal statutes should not be terminated absent an express declaration by
Congress to that effect.'" The court then applied three tests to determine the
impact of the CFTCA upon the challenged statutes.'" First, the court stated
that " `the implication [of termination] must be clear, necessary and irresisti-
"'" See id. at 80-81 ("The distinction between commodities trading and securities law ap-
pears to be more the rsult of historical happenstance than conceptual distinction.")
"' See note 126 supra.
132 18 U.S.C. 1341 (1976) (the mail fraud statute); 18 U.S.C. 1343 (1976) (the wire
fraud statute).
13 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 21,007 (5.D.N.Y. 1980).
"4 The government alleged that the defendant had represented that it would purchase
options for customers but never actually purchased them, disseminated false and misleading in-
vestment recommendations, and employed unskilled sales persons to use high pressure selling
techniques. Id. at 23,925.
153 id.
136 Id.
"' Id. at 23,926.
138 Id. at 23,926-27 and 23,929-30. The wire fraud statute is modeled after the mail
fraud statute; thus, the court's discussion focused upon the mail fraud statute. Id. at 23,925 n.4.
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ble.' "139 Second, the court emphasized that "the legislative intent to repeal
must be manifest in the positive repugnancy between the provisions. "140
Third, the court explained that if the proof required to establish a violation
under the two statutes varies then the later-enacted statute does not repeal the
older one."'
In applying these tests, the court first reasoned that although Congress
equipped the CTFC with extensive power to prosecute violations of the CEA
and to impose civil and criminal sanctions,'" there was no legislative intent
that the CFTC's ability to prosecute was to be exclusive.'" The court noted
that the power to prosecute under criminal provisions other than those under
the CEA did not receive the same treatment by Congress as the power of
federal and state agencies to bring suit to enjoin the allegedly fraudulent sale of
commodity futures.'" The court emphasized that although Congress intended
to divest agencies of their jurisdiction "[to free] the exchanges from having to
conform their practices to conflicting agency standards," 145
 other statutory pro-
visions were not similarly terminated. To support its conclusion, the court re-
lied upon Chairman Talmadge's assurance that persons in the trading industry
would not be exempted from existing laws.'" Although the court in Abrahams
mentioned the controversy surrounding the continued availability of private
actions under the CEA,' 47
 it did not purport to resolve the issue nor did it
discuss the similar controversy surrounding the applicability of private
remedies under the securities laws. Nevertheless, the legislative history in-
dicates that private actions under the securities laws were not to be extin-
guished.
The second inquiry in the court's preemption analysis, whether the mail
fraud statute provisions were repugnant to those of the CEA, was also decided
in favor of maintaining the mail fraud actions.'" Noting that the mail fraud
statute is broad and has remained applicable in other circumstances where
comprehensive legislation has been passed, the court concluded that it and the
'" Id. at 23,927 (quoting Blumenthal v. United States, 88 F.2d 522, 526 (8th Cir.
1937)).
'" Id.
in Id. at 23,929-30. Although the court refers to a later-enacted "more specific" statute
preempting an older, more general" one, the same test applies regardless of differences in
specificity. See United States v. Shareef, 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 21,108, at 24,464 (2d
Cir. 1980); United States v. Green, 494 F.2d 820, 827 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1004
(1974).
' 42
 United States v. Abrahams, 2 Comm. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 21,007, at 23,927
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); see also text and note at note 25 supra.
143 Id. at 23,928.
144 Id. at 23,928 n.10. Accord, United States v. Shareef, 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 1
21,108 (2d Cir. 1980).
' 4 ' United States v. Abrahams, 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. at 23,928 n.10 (emphasis sup-
plied).
146 Id. at 23,928.
142
 Id. at 23,928 n.10.
148
 Id. at 23,928-29.
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CEA complemented, rather than conflicted with, each other.'" Much as the
provisions of the mail fraud and commodities statutes work towards the same
goal of controlling and remedying fraudulent situations, portions of the
securities acts also seek to achieve this purpose. Indeed, the only difference in
purpose between the statutes is that each is concerned with particular cir-
cumstances where fraud can arise — one where the mails are used, one where a
security is involved and one where a commodity is identified. Just as the mail
fraud statute and the CEA may overlap without threatening interference in the
independent functioning of each statutory framework, so can the securities and
commodities laws. Therefore, the private actions under the securities laws, like
the enforcement actions under the mail fraud statute, should continue to apply.
The third test for determining whether the CFTCA precluded suits under
the mail fraud statute focused upon the proof required to establish a violation of
the two statutes. If the requisite proof varies, then the later-enacted statute
does not preempt the earlier one. The court concluded that the mail fraud
statute does contain different proof requirements.' 5° Similarly, the securities
statutes and the CEA contain important differences regarding liability which
bolster the argument that the securities actions, like the mail and wire fraud
statutes, were intended to remain applicable. The Abrahams court's refusal to
expand the scope of the CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction to eliminate another
federal antifraud provision is relevant to and supportive of an interpretation of
the CFTCA which allows private remedies for fraud under the securities
statutes to remain available to defrauded investors in commodity-security trans-
actions.
No other instances exist where the granting of exclusive regulatory
jurisdiction to one federal agency potentially compromised implied private
rights under another federal statutory framework.'" Nevertheless, other
149 Id. at 23,929.
"° Id. at 23,930.
151 See Hewitt, supra note 3, at 320. Litigation involving the Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. 55 1001-1381 (1976) (ERISA), evinces a related concern
regarding the effect of a comprehensive federal statute upon remedies under other federal legisla-
tion. ERISA was enacted to place the power to regulate employee benefit plans under the federal
government. See Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Kramarsky, 485 F. Supp. 300, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
This statute explicitly provides that state laws relating to certain employee benefit plans are pre-
empted, 29 U.S.C. 5 1144(a) (1976), and that no federal law is ousted, 29 U.S.C. S 1144(d)
(1976). Consequently, implied rights under federal law should continue to apply to employee
benefit plans. In International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979), however, the
Supreme Court appears to have reached an opposite conclusion. Close analysis reveals, however,
that the Court did not actually decide this issue. In Teamsters, the Court held that implied rights
under the securities statutes were not applicable to compulsory, noncontributory pension plans.
Id. at 570. The Court emphasized both that the SEC had never expressed the view before this
litigation that such plans were securities, Id. at 569, and that such plans do not in fact resemble
securities. Id. at 558-62. The Court suggested that since an extensive legislative scheme existed
under ERISA for remedying any fraud, there was no need to torture the securities laws to render
them applicable. Id. at 569-70,
The reasoning in this case is distinguishable from the role of the securities statutes in the
commodities industry for two reasons. First, the Court did not actually rule that the securities
laws were ousted; it merely weighed the existence of a comprehensive alternative legislative
scheme as one factor in deciding whether to perform definitional gymnastics with the securities
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statutory schemes that have ousted federal or state regulation and laws have ex-
pressly addressed which remedies are extinguished upon their enactment.
Their straightforward provisions contrast sharply with the absence of any
clause in the CFTCA terminating private actions under the securities laws. For
example, the Copyright Act,'" effective in 1978, openly avers that:
all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive
rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by [portions
of this title] . . . are governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no
person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such
work under the common law or statutes of any State.'"
Similarly, the Federal Employment Compensation Act (FECA) 1 " which
ousted the applicability of the Federal Torts Claims Ace" to claims covered by
FECA explicitly provides for such an exclusive remedy. 156
 Thus, where specific
rights or remedies have been nullified, Congress has been careful to state clear-
ly its intent to create exclusive liabilities and remedies.
A final analogy supporting the argument that private actions under the
securities statutes are to continue to be available to defrauded investors in
commodity-security transactions is found in the court's analysis in Credit Data of
Arizona, Inc, v, Arizona."' There, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
illustrated the policies behind the preemption doctrine and the Federal Fair
Credit Reporting Act (FCRA).'" The FCRA provides that:
This subchapter does not annul, alter, affect, or exempt any person
laws. Second, in contrast to the previous noninvolvement of the SEC in pension plans, the SEC
and several courts had concluded prior to the enactment of the CFTCA that certain trading ac-
counts in commodities futures were securities. Therefore, the extension of the securities concepts
to commodity-security transactions after the enactment of the CFTCA has not been a novel ex-
periment. Furthermore, such extension did not require any torturing of the securities laws as a
similar extension would have required in the pension plan field. Noncontributory pension plans
do not resemble closely a security while they are undoubtedly pension plans; whereas,
commodity-security transactions are arguably as much like investment contracts as they are like
traditional commodities. Thus, the Court's reasoning in Teamsters should not be extended to the
issue of retaining the availability of private fraud remedies under the securities statutes in
commodity-security transactions.
1 " Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. SS 101-810 (1976 & Supp. 111 1979).
153 Id. at 301(a) (1976).
"4 5 U.S.C. SS 8101-8193 (1976).
'" 28 U.S.C. SS 2671-2680 (1976).
'" 5 U.S.C. 5 8116(c) provides:
The liability of the United States or an instrumentality thereof under this sub-
chapter or any extension thereof with respect to the injury or death of an employee
is exclusive and instead of all other liability of the United States or the instrumen-
tality to the employee, his legal representative, spouse, dependents, next of kin,
and any other person otherwise entitled to recover . . . because of the injury or
death in a direct judicial proceeding, in a civil action, or in admiralty, or by an ad-
ministrative or judicial proceeding under a workman's compensation statute or
under a Federal tort liability statute. However, this subsection does not apply to a
master or a member of a crew of a vessel.
Id. See Reep v. United States, 557 F.2d 204, 206 (9th Cir. 1977).
'" 602 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1979).
18 15 U.S.C. SS 1681-1681t (1976).
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subject to the provisions of this subchapter from complying with the
laws of any State with respect to the collection, distribution, or use of
any information on consumers, except to the extent that those laws
are inconsistent with any provision of this subchapter, and then only
to the extent of the inconsistency. 159
The court, in interpreting "inconsistent" as it was used in the statute, conclud-
ed that the state law gave the consumer slightly more protection than the
federal law in the pending situation and that this more extensive protection did
not amount to an inconsistency. 160 The CFTCA and the securities statutes, like
the federal and state laws in Credit Data, have the same goals — protecting in-
vestors and preventing fraud. Although the securities statutes, like the state law
in Credit Data, might provide the investor with more protection than the
CFTCA in certain circumstances, this discrepancy is insufficient to qualify as
an "inconsistency." Therefore, the securities statutes, like the state law in
Credit Data, should remain available to defrauded investors in commodity-
security transactions. Analysis of other statutory provisions raising similar
issues of preemption and ousting of previously existing remedies thus reveals
that the language of the CFTCA supports the continued availability of private
remedies under the securities statutes.
CONCLUSION
Policy considerations behind the enactment of the CTFCA support the
continued availability of private actions for fraud under the securities statutes
in commodity-security transactions. If fraudulent and scandalous schemes are
to be effectively detected, eliminated, and remedied, judicial involvement is
necessary. Furthermore, the adjudicatory nature of fraud issues — as evidenc-
ed by SEC, CFTC, and congressional support of judicial resolution of an-
tifraud actions — reveals that the CFTC's exclusive regulatory jurisdiction
over the commodities industry would not be undermined by allowing the
securities private fraud remedies to continue. In addition, Congress evidenced
no intent or desire to terminate the applicability of the antifraud provisions of
the securities statutes. Rather, emphasis was placed upon preserving both the
viability of federal laws and court jurisdiction. Finally, the language of the
CFTCA militates in favor of the continued applicability of these remedies.
Therefore, courts should not undertake a superficial analysis of the statutory
language as well as legislative history and use the express intention to ter-
minate SEC power to extinguish private remedies under the securities laws.
Rather, Congress' goal of protecting the investor in commodity transactions
should be upheld and private fraud remedies under the securities statutes
should remain available to defrauded investors in commodity-security trans-
actions.
MARJORY D. ROBERTSON
19 Id.	 1681t.
' 6° Credit Data, 602 F.2d at 198.
